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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES
JOHN W. EDMONDS, Im*
GEORGE W. TAYLOR, JR.**
"Truth has become a very elusive item since the Federal
Government undertook to define it. "***
The initial proposed title for this article was "The Truth Shall Make
You A Fee." The article will discuss some of the complexities that have
arisen under the Truth in Lending (TIL) Act, a federal law designed to
make vital information more available to consumers in a clear and mean-
ingful form. It is hard to be opposed to a concept such as Truth. The
illustrations set forth herein will demonstrate, however, that the attempt
to define Truth in clear and meaningful terms has been largely a failure.
Perhaps the problem is that the regulators, the courts, the creditors, and
the debtors cannot reach a clear and meaningful consensus on what is clear
and meaningful.
We have reached a day where Acts are labeled in terms indicating noble
and moral undertakings, or perhaps the correction of ignoble or immoral
activities. In 1968 we had Truth-in-Lending, in 1970 Fair Credit Report-
ing2 and Fair Credit Billing,3 in 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity,' and, in
1977, Fair Debt Collection Practices.5 The contradictions of these various
purposes are spotlighted in section 804 of the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act,' which makes it a violation of the Act to tell the truth when the
recipient of a debt collector's telephone call asks why the debtor is being
sought. This rule is apparently premised on the reasoning that it could be
demeaning to tell someone that the person is being sought to try to collect
a debt. A good argument could be made that the prior-restraint-of-free-
speech concept of the first amendment has been largely by-passed by these
various acts, which require a communication of truth only in specific terms
in some cases and prohibit truth in others. The command, "In this way
and this way only shall you speak the truth," is hard to square with first
amendment concepts.
The discussion of various cases herein, and their criticism, is not neces-
* Mays, Valentine, Davenport & Moore, Richmond, Virginia; B.A. (1953), LL.B. (1956),
University of Richmond.
** Mays, Valentine, Davenport & Moore, Richmond, Virginia; B.A. (1970), University
of North Carolina; J.D. (1976), Duke University.
*** The quotation above is taken from the report of Mr. Edmonds to the Virginia Bank-
ers Association at the end of his first year as counsel, in 1969, in reporting on a series of
programs designed to acquaint lawyers and bankers with the new Truth-in-Lending statute
and regulation. It is recognized to be bad taste to quote oneself, but it is also gratifying,
perhaps too gratifying, to have a statement made at an early age prove so prophetic.
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1667(e) (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1681t (1976).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666 to 1666j (1976).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 to 1691f (1976).
Pub. L. No. 95-109 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1601 note, §§ 1692 to 16 92o).
£ Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 804 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1692b).
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sarily a criticism or dispargement of the particular judges involved. They
were given the job of applying a federal statute, the Truth-in-Lending Act
("The Act"), of 57 sections, and a federal regulation, Regulation Z, of 43
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, which in turn have produced
over 600 staff rulings (official and unofficial) and interpretations by the
Federal Reserve Board. In 1977 alone, there were more than 100 official
staff rulings and about 300 unofficial staff rulings.7 Perhaps if the statute
and Regulation Z had been held to the "clear and meaningful" standard
to which creditors were referred, all of these interpretations and the more
than 8000 federal court cases filed would not have been necessary.'
The Federal Reserve Board has promulgated Regulation Z9 to imple-
ment and explain the Truth-in-Lending Act." Under Act Sections 105 and
130(f) this Regulation is effectively the controlling standard." Hereinafter
references to the substantive provisions of truth-in-lending will be to the
Regulation only, except where the Act is specified.
We will discuss a few holdings that we think demonstrate some of the
problems-uncertainty as to the fundamental nature and purpose of truth-
in-lending, ambushes in the Regulation, fanatical insistence on terminol-
ogy, and impossible requirements. One big problem for a creditor is finding
reliable guidance. When a judge tells you the law, it is too late. Some
creditors try to obey the law by consulting lawyers, or the Federal Reserve
Board. Our first step is to see the results of such efforts.
I. GOOD FAITH AS TO A CONFUSING LAW WAS NOT THE TEST:
OR, WHOM CAN YOU TRUST?
Advice of Counsel
Section 130(c) of the Act provides that a creditor is not liable for a
truth-in-lending violation if he can show "the violation was not intentional
and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error."' 2 The exact scope
of this defense is not yet clear.
Seeking and taking the advice of an attorney has turned out not to be
a procedure reasonably adapted to avoid error. Creditors have argued that
section 130(c) should protect them in cases where they have followed the
advice of their attorneys, but that defense has been held inadequate.
I BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR
THE YEAR 1977, 18 (CCH reprint).
For the year ending June 30, 1977, there were 2183 cases filed under truth-in-lending.
1977 ANN. REP. OF DIR. OF ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS at 106. This figure does not include
cases in which truth-in-lending issues arose after filing. For preceding years, the correspond-
ing figures were 1974-1682, 1975-2237, and 1976-2147. Id. Figures are not available for ealier
years.
9 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667(e).
See Mourning v. Family Publications, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
Truth-in-Lending Act § 130(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1976).
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(Courts have not defended this conclusion by disparaging lawyers or by
saying even lawyers cannot understand TIL.) The first, and leading, case
on this point is Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 3 which held
that section 130(c) protected only a creditor who had made a clerical error.
In that case, the creditor had failed to disclose an annual percentage rate
where (the court held) he ought to have disclosed it. The court said that
the section 130(c) defense was not available: "It is undisputed that defen-
dant carefully, deliberately-intentionally-omitted the disclosure in
question. That defendant. . . mistook the law does not make its actions
any less intentional."'" The court held that the defense was available only
for clerical errors-and, in addition, the creditor must show that he had
procedures designed to avoid such clerical errors. Regardless of the pres-
ence of gooa faith or avoidance procedures, the defense of unintentional
error was not available for a mistake of law. It is hard to imagine what more
a creditor could do to ensure compliance with the law than follow the
advice of an attorney who is fully informed of the facts; but this is not
enough for truth-in-lending. One reason given by the court for reaching its
conclusion is that there is no such thing as a "procedure" to avoid a
mistake of law. 5 In short, seeing a lawyer is not an acceptable "procedure"
to enable a creditor to take advantage of the section 130(c) defense under
truth-in-lending.
The Ratner decision that the section 130(c) defense is not available for
mistakes of law, but only for clerical errors, has been generally followed.',
Indeed, one court indicated that the procedures to avoid an error necessar-
ily included a double check, and if there were no double checks the defense
did not apply. 7 The court specifically said that it would not be enough
merely to have a well-trained clerk to do the work carefully, but it would
be enough if he were then double checked by another well-trained clerk or
if he himself then checked his figures against a table. "Good faith", then,
triggers an additional expense, to be passed on to the consumer, the
"beneficiary" of truth-in-lending.
Other courts have agreed less extravagantly that the defense applies
only to clerical errors; but it is still not entirely clear that this necessarily
must be the law. For instance, in Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart,' the
,3 329 F. Supp. 270, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
" Id. at 281.
'5 We submit that the court was wrong on this point. Such procedures could be devised,
including regular consultation with lawyers who are experienced in truth-in-lending and who
keep up with developments, scrupulous adherence to their advice, printing of limited quanti-
ties of forms with repeated consultation with counsel before new quantities were printed, and
so forth. There is no guarantee that those procedures, though expensive and well-intentioned,
will succeed, but the same is true of procedures intended to avoid clerical errors.
" But see Welmaker v. W. T. Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1972), discussed in
note 29 infra.
11 Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 878-79 & n.14 (7th Cir.
1976).
" 503 F.2d 1161, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1974).
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court said the exception applied only to clerical errors, and expressed
concern that requiring a borrower to prove that a violation was intentional
would make the civil remedy "a hollow one."' 9 The court indicated, how-
ever, that the creditor's counsel had refused to give advice as to one of the
points that evidently proved to be a violation, and gave no advice as to
another."0 If that is what happened, the true rule of this case is not that
there is no defense where the error was "judgmental with respect to legal
requirements of the Act and not clerical in nature" as the court said.'
Instead the rule may simply be that advice of counsel is not a procedure
to avoid the error where counsel does not advise on the point. Similarly,
Palmer v. Wilson 22 recited that the defense applies only to clerical errors,
but in fact there were so many mistakes in Palmer, including the omission
of the name of the creditor, 23 that perhaps there really was no procedure
at all.
One of the commonly cited cases for the "clerical errors only" proposi-
tion is Buford v. American Finance Co. 24 There, the creditor had sent its
employees to seminars and had used forms that it thought were reliable
since they were furnished by presumably well-informed credit life insur-
ance companies. The court said that the omission of required notary's fees
from the finance charge was not covered by the section 130(c) defense,
since the fee had been imposed intentionally. Yet the opinion goes out of
its way to mention that the creditor had not sought legal advice and had
not inquired of the Federal Reserve Board. Again, while the language of
the opinion refers to "clerical errors only," on the facts such a rule was not
necessarily required. This case also raised the fear that TIL would be
stultified if a debtor had to prove intent, a point for which it was cited
by the Haynes court. Neither court tried to reconcile this concern with the
purpose of section 130(c) and neither suggested letting the creditor bear
the burden of disproving intent.
Similarly, the "clerical only" rule was announced in Johnson v. Asso-
ciates Finance, Inc.,'2 where the creditor's reckless (?) reliance on the "tan
pamphlet '2 1 resulted in two of the three errors found. Evidently there was
virtually no procedure at all except reliance on the tan pamphlet (which
really should have been enough). In Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co.,2
also stating the "clerical only" rule, the creditor quite likely never even
" The approach of letting the debtor show the error and then letting the creditor come
forward to demonstrate that the error was "unintentional" is not discussed by the court.
Id. at 1166 n.5.
2, Id. at 1167.
502 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 1974).
See Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F. Supp.'1099, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
24 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1247-48 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
21 369 F. Supp. 1121, 1123-24 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
25 The so-called "tan pamphlet" is the Federal Reserve Board booklet on "What You
Ought To Know About Truth-in-Lending," giving the text of Regulation Z, some questions
and answers, and some forms said to comply with the Act.
2 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Alas. 1971).
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thought of the problem. There was a confess judgment clause in a note,
which evidently did not permit judgment without notice under Alaska law;
the court thought the clause was a "security interest" since it might be
enforced without notice in some other state, and therefore it should have
been disclosed. This decision was reversed,2 on the grounds that since the
clause did not create a security interest under Alaska law, it could not be
held to be a security interest without taking all meaning out of Board
Interpretation 226.202, 2 which says a confess judgment clause is a security
interest "in those States" where there is no requirement of notice.
Thus, while the statement is well-established that the protection of
section 130(c) applies only to clerical errors, the rule itself is not so clear,3"
and a later court might still reject the rule since it was announced mainly
in cases where it did not apply.
The Federal Reserve Board Was Not Reliable
Apparently the courts think creditors are not the only ones who can be
confused by the Act and Regulation-so can the Board. Some cases held
that a creditor was liable even if he had followed the Board's interpreta-
tions." Although interpretation of the law was committed by Congress to
the Federal Reserve Board, under these decisions a creditor could not rely
on the forms prepared by the Federal Reserve Board and its staff.2
- 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972).
- 12 C.F.R. § 226.202 (1977).
0 This problem is also presented in McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1978).
There, a retailer had obtained disclosure forms from the lender that regularly financed its
sales. The forms had been prepared by a law firm that had been expressly asked to comply
with truth-in-lending, but evidently had failed to do so, not disclosing the "deferred payment
price" as required by § 226.8(c)(8)(ii). Again, relying on counsel was not enough. As to good
faith, there was apparently no doubt that the creditor had tried, but the installment creditor
was liable for twice the finance charge plus the debtor's attorneys fees. Again, it is hard to
see what more a creditor could do in his effort to obtain proper forms than get forms from an
institutional lender, prepared by the lender's lawyers.
"1 See Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 757-58 (2d Cir. 1975); Scott v. Liberty
Finance Co., 380 F. Supp. 475, 479 (D. Neb. 1974) (evidently finding also that Board Interpre-
tation 226.818 was wrong). Johnson v. Associates Finance, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121, 1123-24
(S.D. Ill. 1974).
12"But see Welmaker v. W. T. Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 531, 540-45 (N.D. Ga. 1972),
where the court held that a creditor's improper disclosures did not subject him to liability,
in view of the fact that he had relied on the tan pamphlet. In fact the creditor had had its
forms reviewed by both the Federal Reserve staff and-three times-by the Federal Trade
Commission staff. The Court concluded:
It is difficult to imagine any more efforts to comply than those shown here. Prior
approval of all forms and indeed duplication of the sample form recommended by
the supervising governmental agency is the optimum any party can do in the
exercise of good faith. Indeed if the good faith defense envisioned by the Congress
is to have any mpaning whatsoever, these efforts must suffice. To state simply that
"every man is presumed to intend the consequences of his acts" and then to infer
lack of good faith because no act is done gives no meaning to the phrase "resulted
from bona fide error" and cancels out the defense entirely. Section 1640(c) considers
1978]
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Many of these cases should be reversed by the amendments to section
130(f), which provide a defense under the Act if an action or omission was
"in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation, or interpretation or
approval by an official or employee of the Federal Reserve System duly
authorized by the Board to issue such interpretations or approvals. .. ."
This provision was added in 1974, and amended to include the interpreta-
tions by officials or employees in 1976.
Note that the statute requires "conformity with" and not "reliance on."
Nonetheless, it has been held that reliance is an essential element of this
defense.3 3 The effect of the imposition of a reliance requirement is that a
creditor must pay the penalty even if his mistake was so reasonable that
the Board or its staff made the very same mistake, unless the Board hap-
pened to make the mistake first and the creditor happened to know it. And
although the creditor in good faith makes the same mistake as the Board
the creditor suffers a financial penalty, even though the Federal Reserve,
which made the same error despite a supposedly greater expertise, does not
pay a penalty, and does not have to argue that it acted in good faith.
II. THE PURPOSE AND NATURE OF TRUTH IN LENDING
Several issues have arisen that require analysis of the fundamental
purpose and nature of the truth-in-lending requirements. The courts have
not agreed on some of these issues, which suggests that at least some of
the courts have misunderstood, though of course each creditor must under-
stand or pay heavily. Even where the courts do agree, the holdings some-
times "look pretty odd.
34
Void for Vagueness
The large number of official and unofficial interpretations of Regula-
tion Z, and the thousands of cases alleging violations, indicate that the
requirements are none too clear. Some of the burden created by this lack
of clarity necessarily falls on the judges who must ascertain the law. One
such judge, evidently exasperated, wrote that "it may effectively be argued
that the Truth-in-Lending regulations themselves give rise to such
'confusing' disclosure statements that all such statements are per se viola-
not only the act done but the motive, state of mind, and intention to violate the
law inherent in a determination of good faith.
Id. at 544.
" See Pollock v. General Finance Corp., 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 265 (1977).
11 "If an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same person should be party and
Judge, or, which is the same thing, Judge in his own cause, it would be a void Act of
Parliament; for it is impossible that one should be Judge and party, for the Judge is to
determine between party and party, or between the Government and the party; and an Act
of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look petty odd." Holt,
C.J., in City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687 (1701).
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tive of 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(c). Certainly the requirements of the Act have
proved confusing to the courts . . .-.
The authors note with mixed emotion that in Franklin v. First Money,
Inc.," a challenge to the Truth-in-Lending statute in a federal court in
Louisiana, on a basis comparable to the "void for vagueness" theory raised
in some other contexts, was unavailing. The court held that a law is not
unenforceable or void for vagueness merely because courts cannot agree
what it means.
This conclusion was reached notwithstanding the accepted-and ob-
vious-character of the double-finance-charge provision in section 130(a)
as a penalty.37 Indeed, the Franklin court itself acknowledged that this
provision is a penalty.38 Note, however, that in Franklin the challenged
result was merely a finding that a "deferral charge" was really a
"delinquency charge" that should have been disclosed on the initial disclo-
sure sheet. The distinction between deferral charges and delinquency
charges would seem to be one not truly raising the constitutional issue.
Perhaps the problem is inevitable in that all language is ambiguous,
and some language is more ambiguous than other. One cannot help but
ponder whether a statute directed at more violent or reprehensible conduct
would have received more careful scrutiny.39 At any rate, the Supreme
Court did not find a vagueness problem"0 nor has any other court, so it
seems unlikely that the Act or Regulation will be struck down on this
ground. Nonetheless the problem of vagueness may add weight to the
argument that consulting an attorney is a good faith procedure for comply-
ing with the law.
This Penalty Is Not Penal
The Act provides for damages in a civil suit. The damages are calcu-
lated as the actual damage suffered by the plaintiff, plus twice the amount
of the finance charge, plus costs and attorney's fees." This is a stiff pen-
alty, since the finance charge is the creditor's income out of which he pays
expenses, including those that make his services available to persons need-
ing them (and pay his lawyer to advise him on TIL): he loses twice that in
*1 Houston v. Atlanta Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 414 F. Supp. 851, 855-56 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
3' 427 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. La. 1976).
= See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1973); Sellers
v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1976); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 651-52
(9th Cir. 1974). Contra, Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (both decided before
Mourning).
31 427 F. Supp. 66, 72 (E.D. La. 1976).
11 Perhaps we are wrong in our concepts of reprehensibility. We note that a person might
be penalized more heavily for an innocent truth-in-lending violation than for stealing the
entire Total of Payments.
1' Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 375 (1973).
41 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
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addition to making the debtor whole even where he meant no harm and
actually tried to obey the law, and even though the debtor suffered no
harm.42
At a casual glance, an unwary observer might think that the twice-the-
finance-charge element is a penalty-perhaps a civil penalty but nonethe-
less a penalty. And indeed, that is the law today. The Supreme Court itself
referred to it as a civil penalty in Mourning v. Family Publications, Inc.,43
and the Courts of Appeals have relied on its nature as a penalty to support
allowing its award in addition to allowing rescission under section 125.11
But this has not always been the law; before Mourning set them straight
two federal courts had ruled that the awards under Truth-in-Lending were
merely remedial, not penal. One would have been hard put to explain to a
mistaken creditor (in clear and meaningful terms) how he had not been
penalized.
In one early leading case, Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co.,4" the argument was raised that the defendant should not be liable for
a penalty in view of the fact that its interpretation of the statute was
reasonable.46 The court said this argument "may be rejected speedily,"
since "the 'remedial' character of the provisions for civil recoveries quite
overwhelms its allegedly 'penal' aspect." The court thought it would be
"grossly subversive" of the goal of protecting consumers if "reasonable"
violations were exempt from the civil penalty. According to this court, the
only penal sanction in the statute is section 112 (imprisonment and fines
for willful violations).
To somewhat the same effect is Bostwick v. Cohen,4" concluding that
"the civil liability section is remedial rather than penal." The distinction
may have been hard to grasp for a creditor who acted in good faith but was
still stuck for refunding twice the hoped-for income, on top of damages and
attorney's fees, and all without regard for his expenses or intentions.
One problem that may have concerned the defendant in the Ratner
case was that there were a great many possible plaintiffs, and Ratner was
seeking to bring the action as a class action. Possible damages were
$13,000,000. 48 The statute today provides for a ceiling on recoveries in
class actions, limiting them to "the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of
the net worth of the creditor."49 That can be a great deal of money, but
it at least limits the possible liability under the twice-the-finance-charge
42 The twice-the-finance-charge penalty has a $1,000 ceiling, providing some restraint in
large transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976). There is also a $100 floor, id., perhaps
to be sure the creditor notices the penalty in small transactions.
3 411 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1973).
" See, e.g., Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1975); Eby v. Reb Realty,
Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1974).
329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
' Id. at 282.
'7 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
,' See Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976).
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(or $100 to $1,000) provision. If there are more than 5,000 members of the
class, the creditor is benefited by this amendment to the Act even if only
the minimum $100-per-plaintiff penalty would have been awarded; ob-
viously, if a higher penalty would have been awarded then the benefit is
greater. Even so, a $500,000 nonpunitive punishment is quite a blow for a
creditor who, for instance, has committed no fault more serious than say-
ing "finance charges" when he should have said "finance charge," as in
Powers v. Sims & Levin," discussed below (though Powers was not a class
action suit).
Moreover, it may be that this limitation will prove illusory. One district
court recently refused to certify a class action: one stated reason was that
the class-action recovery limit would mean that the class members in effect
waived over 90 percent of the penalty." This is a rather ominous indication
of the court's attitude toward creditor liability.
2
What If There Is No Finance Charge?
Even though the purpose of truth-in-lending is to permit comparison
of finance charges, the Regulation and the Act require disclosure when
there is no finance charge, if the obligation is payable in more than four
installments.53 In this event the question arises: if there is no finance
charge, what is there to compare? Obviously, something other than a fi-
nance charge-perhaps the total of payments. But if one proposed exten-
sion of credit is payable over six months with no finance charge for total
payments of $105.00 and in another extension the cash price is $102.00 with
interest at 12% payable over twelve months with $109.00 (approximately)
total payments, which is the better deal?
Is Rescission Equitable?
Section 125 of the original Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968 conferred "the
right to rescind" on debtors where credit was extended upon the security
of the residence of the person to whom the credit was extended. Section
226.9(a) refers to "principal residence." The creditor was required to in-
form the debtor of his right to rescind within three business days following
consummation or the delivery of the disclosures required under Truth-in-
Lending, whichever was later.
"Rescission" may have had a well-known connotation or definition
prior to this, as the remedy of annulling, abrogating, or unmaking a con-
- 396 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Va. 1975).
Stranger v. American Buyers Club, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 790 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
52 The principal reason for refusing to certify the class, however, was apparently that the
individual plaintiff was in default on the obligation, and was, therefore, not representative
of the entire class. This is an eminently reasonable basis for the decision, at least in cases
where defaulters and non-defaulters may have different interests.
Mourning v. Family Publication Services, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 362 (1973); see 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.2(s) (1977).
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tract, placing the parties to it in the status quo ante. 4 There were some
traps here. The confess judgment clause under which a creditor might
obtain the same type of liens as under any other judgment was held to be
a security interest entitling the debtor to rescission rights.5 Two cases have
gone so far as to hold that a potential mechanic's lien gives rise to rescis-
sion rights. 6
One significant exclusion from the class of transactions subject to sta-
tutory rescission was the creation of a first lien against a dwelling to fi-
nance its acquisition.57 Even here there was another trap: the grant of the
right of rescission in section 125(a) refers to real property that is "used or
is expected to be used as the residence" of the borrower, but the exception
in section 125(e) provides for its non-application to the creation or reten-
tion of a first lien "against a dwelling to finance the acquisition of that
dwelling . . . ." To paraphrase Polly Adler's famous observation that "A
House Is Not A Home," Truth-in-Lending lawyers came up with the
phrase that "A Residence Is Not A Dwelling." In short, a residence might
be improved or unimproved real estate whereas the dwelling could only be
improved. The section 125(e) exception applies only to dwellings, so a
purchase of vacant land is not within the exception. 8
Another trap in section 125 as originally passed was the lack of any
effective statute of limitations if the creditor failed to give the notice or if
there was some material error in the truth in lending disclosures. 5 That
was because the right to rescind lasted for three days after consummation
of the transaction or delivery of all rescission disclosures and all other
material disclosures-whichever was later. Thus the three-day rescission
period did not begin until disclosures were made correctly." This defect or
oversight was corrected by Congress in 1974 by enactment of a new sub-
section 125(f), providing that an obligator's right of rescission expires
three years after the consummation of the transaction, or upon the sale of
the property, whichever occurs earlier, regardless of when disclosures were
SI Dreiling v. Home State Life Ins. Co., 213 Kan. 137, 515 P.2d 757, 766 (1973); Vowels
v. Arthur Murray Studios, Inc., 12 Mich. App. 359, 163 N.W.2d, 38 n.7 (1968); Ray v.
Beneficial Finance Co., 92 N.J. Super. 519, 224 A.2d 143, 154 (1966); Tucker v. Beam, 343
Ill. App. 290, 98 N.E.2d 871, 873 (1951).
1 See Charnita, Inc. v. FTC, 479 F.2d 684, 685-86 (3d Cir. 1973); Douglas v. Beneficial
Finance Co., 469 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1972). Virginia amended § 8-359 of the Virginia Code
(present § 8.01-434) to provide that the judgment so confessed would not become a lien
against the debtor's principal residence until after the passage of time, enabling the debtor
to enter any defense which he might have under Viriginia law.
11 N. C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 827 (1975); and Gardner & North Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors,
464 F.2d 838, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1972) both upholding Regulation Z § 226.9(a).
$' 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(g)(1) (1977).
Charnita, Inc. v. FTC, 479 F.2d 684, 687 (3d Cir. 1973).
' Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 1974); Sosa v. Fite,
498 F.2d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1974).
" But see Wachtel v. West, 376 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874
(1973), (seemingly applying the doctrine of laches).
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made. Jamerson v. Miles6 held that the three-year limitation was applica-
ble to causes of action arising prior to the effective date of the 1974 enact-
ment as well as those arising thereafter. The court indicates that this
limitation is jurisdictional.
The traditional equitable doctrine of rescission contemplates restora-
tion to prior status. The statutory rescission right may be conditioned upon
tender of repayment by the customer.12 The court in LaGrone v. Johnson3
conditioned rescission of a consumer loan upon tender of the net amounts
advanced by the creditor, noting expressly that the violations "were not
egregious and the equities heavily favor the creditors."' , Yet, in Burley v.
Bastrop Loan Co., 5 it was held that the lender was not entitled to return
of the" loan proceeds from the borrower. Upon the borrower's attempted
rescission, the lender had refused to return the down payment or to termi-
nate the security interest; this was also true in Powers v. Sims & Levin,"'
and the Burley court relied on the later-reversed district court decision in
Powers." A like decision was reached in Gerastra v. Hibernia National
Bank." Sosa v. Fite" appears to reject an incorporation of the equitable
concepts. In Rachbach v. Cogswell,70 the court of appeals permitted a lower
court to order payment of interest notwithstanding section 125(b), since
rescission is an equitable remedy-but held that tender by the borrower
was not a condition for rescission.
Generally speaking, a plaintiff who elects the equitable remedy of res-
cission under state law or common law principles waives damages. This is
not necessarily true in the case of Truth-in-Lending, with the courts gener-
ally holding that the debtor is entitled to both rescission and damages.7
We would observe that the combined grant of rescission and damages can
hardly be seen as merely returning the parties to their prior positions. In
fact, an earlier case had held that the remedies of rescission and damages
were inconsistent and that an election to seek recission constitutes aban-
donment of the damages claimed.
72
A recent bright light, at least from the creditor's standpoint, was Ivey
v. HUD,73 in which the plaintiff sought rescission because of an $11.30
421 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
42 Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1221-22 (4th Cir. 1976); Palmer v. Wilson,
502 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1974).
- 534 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1976).
I7 d.
407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La. 1975).
'7 396 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Va. 1975).
407 F. Supp. at 775.
411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1975).
498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974).
7- 547 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1976).
1' See Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976); Sellers v. Wollman, 510
F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975); Eby v. Reb Realty Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1974).
72 Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
" 428 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
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disclosure error in a transaction involving total payments of $12,066.50.
The schedule and amounts of payments were evidently disclosed correctly,
but the "total of payments" was incorrectly disclosed as $12,055.20. The
court denied rescission, holding that under section 125 "material disclo-
sures" means "important disclosures.
' '7
1
The significance of the requirement that the notice of the rescission
right be given after the consummation of the transaction or the entering
into of a legal contract (which by definition thereupon becomes a voidable
contract) is demonstrated in the case of Doggett v. County Savings & Loan
Co. 75 There, the notice of rescission was given at the time the borrower
made the loan application and entered into a home improvement contract,
but before the acceptance of the application by the lender, or the disclosure
of the dollar information required by Truth-in-Lending. The notice of the
right to rescind was held to have been given prematurely and to be ineffec-
tive. In Doggett, the time between the giving of the notice and the entering
of the loan transaction was so substantial that the notice can hardly be
seen as part of the same transaction. The law purports to require a rigid
schedule-disclosures, then consummation, then notice of right to rescind.
The language in Doggett suggests that strict adherence to this is necessary.
In a closer case, however, it is submitted that a creditor who gave notice
immediately before the transaction was consummated, but at the time of
the application, would feel that he had been "trapped" by an overly tech-
nical reading of this law.
The answer to the question of whether rescission is an equitable remedy
under Truth-in-Lending, unfortunately, seems to depend upon the partic-
ular judge involved, not upon a clear and meaningful statute or regulation.
A Question For The Jury
Is a truth-in-lending action an action "at common law" within the
meaning of the seventh amendment? It is not clear whether a party in a
truth in lending case has a constitutional right to a jury trial. In Mosley v.
National Finance Co.," Chief Judge Gordon, relying on a Fourth Circuit
decision in an age discrimination case, held that a jury trial was required.
The Northern District of Georgia had apparently held to the contrary. 7
According to one report, this issue arose in Georgia when the Northern
District was so overwhelmed with truth-in-lending cases that the judges
began assigning them routinely to the bankruptcy judges sitting as special
7, See also Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La. 1975) (failure to
disclose an acceleration right was held to trigger the right of rescission even though the Fifth
Circuit was later to hold this was not even a required disclosure). Martin v. Commercial
Securities Co., 539 F.2d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1976).
373 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
7' 440 F. Supp. 621 (M.D.N.C. 1977). Accord Hawkins v. Columbia Lincoln Mercury,
Inc., 852 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-2' (S.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 1978).
n See Warren v. GAC Finance Corp., C.A. No. 17980 (N.D. Ga. July 18, 1973).
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masters. 8 The Mosley court cited the Georgia case but declined to follow
it, since the Fourth Circuit precedent seemed to control.
Itemizing Single-Component Finance Charges
Another line of cases held that a single component of a finance charge
must be given another name. Under the former language of the Regula-
tion,7 which said a description was necessary for each component of the
finance charge, many cases found a requirement that the single component
of a finance charge be disclosed. 0 On the other hand, some cases found that
no further disclosure of a single component was required.'
The number of cases on this point indicates that the statute and regula-
tion were not clear and meaningful. Perhaps one half of the judges constru-
ing the statute saw differing "clear and meaningful" interpretations. A
prudent lawyer probably advised his clients that although he did not be-
lieve the Regulation required the disclosure of the description of a single
"component" of a finance charge, the safer course was to disclose anyhow.
Neither the courts nor the prudent lawyers reached the question of the
benefit to the consumer of relabeling the single-component finance charge
as either "interest" or "time-price differential." As far as facilitating shop-
ping for credit, which is the primary avowed purpose of the Act,8 2 the
consumer could be presented with the problem of whether an 11% "time-
price differential" is a better deal than a 10% "interest rate," which in turn
could depend on the "cash price" or "total of payments." The labeling of
the single component finance charge does not and could not enhance his
ability to shop for credit. The present version of sections 226.8(c)(8) &
(d) (3) clearly requires separate disclosure of components only "where the
total charge consists of two or more types of charges."
I. SOME UNCLEAR AND INCONSPICUOUS RULES
"The Act, although remedial, must nonetheless be read to provide clear
meaning to both lender and borrower. It should not have hidden mean-
ings."8I
78 See 1 R. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL 3.10115].
71 The Board later issued Interpretation 226.820 saying what Regulation Z meant, then
amended §§ 226.8(c)(8) & (d)(3) to their present form and rescinded the Interpretation. See
Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 929 (1977).
" See, e.g., Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 761 (2d Cir. 1975) (decided under
Connecticut, not federal, law); Lewis v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 416 F. Supp. 514, 517
(D.D. C. 1976); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722, 726 (E.D. La. 1976),
rev 'd. on this issue, 539 F.2d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Associates Finance, Inc.,
369 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
"1 See, e.g., Bond v. Shape Spa, Inc., 5 CONS. CrED. Gum. (CCH) 98,436 (E.D. La.
1976); Cosby v. Mellon Bank, 407 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Gibson v. Family Finance
Corp., 404 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. La. 1975); Bloomer v. McKnight Road Dodge, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 403, 405 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
See Act § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
Hickman v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Inc., 566 F.2d 44, 48 (8th Cir. 1977).
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The Act and Regulation require disclosures to be clear, conspicuous,
and in "meaningful sequence."84 The law is not held to the same standard,
and some rules discovered by courts were not clear or conspicuous until the
opinions were handed down. To give the flavor of truth in lending, it may
be useful to look briefly at some of the surprising rules that have appeared.
These are rules that are not necessarily irrational or even unreasonable,
but were so unpredictable that efforts to comply with truth in lending take
on some features of playing a slot machine.
Prepaid Finance Charges
It would seem that the language "prepaid finance charge" taken at face
value would mean than the finance charge had been prepaid. Such defini-
tion of the term as is found in Regulation Z section 226.8(d) refers to it in
legalese as "any amount referred to in paragraph (e) required to be ex-
cluded from the amount in subparagraph (1) . . . ." Subsection (e) seems
to require exclusion of any "finance charge paid separately, in cash or
otherwise . . .to the creditor . . .or withheld by the creditor ... 
(Emphasis added.)
In Jones v. Community Loan & Investment Corp.,8" the creditor im-
posed a loan fee or service charge which was added to (not deducted from)
the principal amount of the loan, to be collected over the life of the loan.
Interest was chargeable under Georgia law on this unpaid service charge,
and was in fact charged. The Fifth Circuit held that the charge was
"prepaid" at the time of the loan closing, since it was a one-time charge,
not subject to rebate. Therefore, the court thought it was an integral part
of "the credit of which the customer had the actual use" at the time the
note was signed. Thus, the word "prepaid" seems to mean "earned" and
not "collected," at least in the Fifth Circuit.
On rehearing the court reasoned that the limiting of the term "prepaid
finance charge" to charges already paid or withheld would render the term
"meaningless." One would be hard put to explain to the average debtor,
or average creditor, or even the average lawyer, in meaningful terms, that
a charge which had been "prepaid" must nevertheless be again "paid."
Thus, in the gigantic area of the Fifth Circuit, the word "prepaid" has no
connotation as to whether or not the charge has in fact been paid (or
withheld), there can be an unpaid prepaid finance charge.
There is an answer that would protect the creditor but which would
hardly benefit the consumer. The creditor could require the loan fee to be
paid in cash, or withheld at closing, but not permit it to be added to the
principal balance and collected over the life of the loan.
Acceleration on Default
An acceleration provision, or the right to call a loan, is something of
which we suspect all, or nearly all, consumers know-that the loan will be
Act § 121, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1976); reg. Z § 226.6(a), 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1977).
'5 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(e) (1977).
81 526 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1976).
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called and the collateral repossessed upon default. And we submit this is
not an area where credit shopping is going to reveal significant variances.
Neither the Act nor the Regulation requires disclosure of this right, at least
not in express or "clear and meaningful" terms. Nonetheless, the issue has
been raised repeatedly in litigation, with varying results.
One court of appeals concluded that acceleration is not a charge and
need not be disclosed unless unearned interest is accelerated. 7 Two others
concluded that acceleration is not a charge and no disclosure is required.8
Still another concluded that acceleration is a charge, relying on an earlier
opinion involving late charges.8
Some district courts have concluded that acceleration is not a charge
and no disclosure is required." Others have held that acceleration is a
charge and disclosure is required.' A third group has said that acceleration
is not a charge but disclosure is required for a meaningful disclosure.2 Still
others ruled that acceleration is not a charge, unless the acceleration is of
unearned interest. 3 Finally, some held that acceleration is a subsequent
occurrence exempt from disclosure. 4 Recent Fifth Circuit decisions 5 may
change the law under the district court decisions from Georgia and Louis-
iana. Though nothing in the Act or Regulation mentions acceleration as
" Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 266-68 (3d Cir. 1975).
Rx Begay v. Ziems Motor Co., 550 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1977); Martin v. Commercial
Securities Company, Inc., 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge, Inc., 539
F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976); Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976).
" LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976); cf. Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Properties,
Inc., 511 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1975) (disclosure statement inadequate because of failure to state
how charges for late payments calculated). The Ninth Circuit has also said acceleration is a
prepayment rather than a default. St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 98,051 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1977). LaGrone was distinguished on the ground that it
merely assumed that disclosure was required.
11 Thompson v. Twin City Fin. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 924, 926 (W.D. La. 1976); Barksdale
v. Peoples Financial Corp., 393 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd, 543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.
1976); Jones v. East Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 532 F.2d
746 (3d Cir. 1976); Wiggs v. BMA Investment Co., 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,676 (N.D.
Ga. 1974) (opinion of Special Master).
11 Clausen v. Beneficial Finance Co., 423 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Kessler v.
Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 405 F. Supp. 122 (D. Hawaii 1975) (ruling prospective only); Meyers
v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974); Garza v. Chicago Health
Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
32 Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975); Pugh v. American Tractor
Trailer Training, Inc., 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,827 (D. Conn. 1974).
11 Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La. 1976); Frank v. Reserve
Consumer Discount Co., 398 F. Supp. 703 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Barrett v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc.,
395 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd, 543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976); McDaniel v. Fulton
Nat'l Bank, 395 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd, 543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976); Richenber-
gen v. Chrysler Cred. Corp., 547 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1977) (discussing alternative theories of
non-application).
11 St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976), rev'd, 5 CONS.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,051 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1977).
,1 See note 88 supra.
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something to be disclosed, the prudent course seems to be to disclose it.
For a lawyer preparing forms for his client, this may give plenty of cases
to analyze, and justify a more significant fee. The disclosure does not seem
to benefit the consumer; and the efficient creditor must pass the expense
on, while the merely greedy creditor does likewise.
Rule of 78's
The regulation requires identification of the method of computing the
rebate of a pre-computed finance charge when the customer pays a closed-
end account in advance." Probably the most common ways of computing
the rebate are pro rata and by the Rule of 78. On the pro rata basis, the
amount refunded bears the same ratio to the total finance charge (or total
interest) as the time remaining on the obligation bears to the originally
agreed time. The Rule of 78 is not susceptible to such a simple explanation,
and would pose difficulties for lenders seeking to explain it. In fact, it
would be an unusual court that would characterize any specific, detailed
explanation of this Rule as clear and meaningful. We note that the courts
critical of the short-form identification (Rule of 78's) did not have the te-
merity to suggest a model form for explaining the rule." The regulation
does not require an "explanation" of the method, however, but only an
"identification." Nonetheless, two courts have held that it was not enough
merely to identify "the Rule of 78."11
It is not clear that an explanation of the Rule of 78, in terms sufficient
to be understood by all consumers, can be drafted; if it could be drafted,
it might well detract from the other disclosures, and could make it impossi-
ble to include all disclosures on one side of a piece of paper of normal
length.9 For those reasons, the Federal Reserve Board has issued an official
Board interpretation to the effect that the section 226.8(b) (7) requirement
for identification of the rebate method "is satisfied simply by reference by
name to the 'rule of 78's' or other method, as applicable.'" That this
interpretation is within the power of the Board would seem obvious. It was
evidently not obvious to some people, but it was so held in Bone v. Hiber-
nia Banks,0' and Beneficial Discount Co. v. Johnson."'2
" 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1977).
' Anyone seeking a reliable, though not very readable, explanation of the Rule of 78, can
consult VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.32 (Supp. 1977); see also Johnson v. Associates Finance, Inc.,
369 F. Supp. 1121, 1123 n.5 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
" Johnson v. Associates Finance, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Ill. 1974); Roberts v.
National School of Radio & Television Broadcasting, 374 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
" See 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1977).
"' Official Board Interpretation § 226.818, 12 C.F.R. § 226.818 (1977).
101 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974); accord, Gantt v. Commonwealth Loan Co., 854
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-23 (8th Cir. Feb. 15, 1978).




The Regulation requires disclosure of security interests."3 Many secu-
rity agreements by their terms cover after-acquired property property. It
seems security agreements by their terms cover after-acquired property. It
seems reasonable to assume that after-acquired property in a loan subject
to truth-in-lending will be consumer goods; and of course, in the case of
consumer goods, Uniform Commercial Code section 9-204 limits the effect
of after-acquired-property clauses to property acquired within ten days
after the giving of value. Nonetheless, the forms in the tan pamphlet
presented a short legend stating that "after-acquired property is in-
cluded," with no further explanation. Many creditors made similar disclo-
sures. About seven years after the promulgation of Truth-in-Lending,
many cases discovered that this disclosure was defective, in that it failed
to disclose the limitations of the U.C.C. upon an after-acquired property
clause as to consumer goods.0 4
Regulation Z May Not Contain All Of The Required Disclosures
It would seem at first blush that if a creditor were to comply with
Regulation Z (and specifically section 226.8, expressly dealing with dis-
closures in other than open-end credit), the creditor would be protected.
All he would have to do is make the disclosures outlined at length therein.
The creditor tried this method of compliance in Pollock v. General Finance
Corp. 0 5 In that case, the creditor disclosed the "Amount Financed" (Reg.
Z section 226.8(d)(1)), the "Finance Charge" (Reg. Z section 226.8(d)(3)),
and the "Total of Payments" (Reg. Z section 226.8(b)(3)). However, be-
cause of insurance charges of $16.08, voluntarily elected by the debtor, the
"Amount Financed" was higher than the amount of cash given to the
debtor.
The Fifth Circuit found the statement defective in this respect, not-
withstanding its conformity to Regulation Z. Relying upon the require-
ment under section 129(a) of the Act10 to disclose "the amount of credit
of which the obligor will have the actual use," the court found that failure
'0 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.7(a)(7) & 226.8(b)(5) (1977).
101 See, e.g., Pollock v. General Finance Corp., 535 F. 2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 265 (1977); Willis v. Town Finance Corp., 416 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Sneed
v. Beneficial Finance Co., 410 F. Supp. 10 (D. Hawaii 1976); Stone v. Modem Loan Co., 5
CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,356 (W.D. Ky. 1976); Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F.
Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975); Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Ill. 1974);
Evans v. Household Fin. Corp., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
99,007 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D.
Iowa 1972). Note that this is part of the continuing issue of whether a creditor should disclose
what was agreed or should disclose the effect of the agreements as modified by state law. See
the discussion in Pinkett v. Credithrift of America, Inc., No. 2, 430 F. Supp. 113, 116-17 (N.D.
Ga. 1977). As to after-acquired property the issue is settled, at least to the extent that most
attorneys will advise disclosing this limitation.
1- 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976).
101 5 U.S.C. § 1639(g) (1976).
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to disclose these "proceeds" (sometimes referred to as "cash in fist") sepa-
rately was a violation." 7
This analysis was rejected in DeJaynes v. General Finance Corp.,'0 8
where the court stated that the disclosure was not required by Regulation
Z. The court said the congressional scheme of having just one Regulation
Z promulgated by one designated agency-the Federal Reserve-was pre-
ferable to having various Regulation Z's as interpreted (or "promulgated")
by the various federal courts across the country. The court even found it
to be the Congressional intent that
the purveyors of consumer credit be sufficiently apprised of their
obligations under the statute that they may act with confidence
that their compliance with existing regulations will protect them
from multifarious litigation.'
How does one advise a client? In the Fifth Circuit, Pollock seems to
control. The denial of certiorari, although not binding on the Supreme
Court, does lend a further dignity to the Pollock opinion; but the other
violations found in the Pollock case may render the denial of certiorari less
persuasive on this single point. Consider, however, that another court
might find the additional term "loan proceeds" confusing and thus a viola-
tion of section 226.6(c). Perhaps the answer is to try to rely upon unofficial
staff ruling number 1162 of March 14, 1977110 which provides that no sepa-
rate disclosure of "loan proceeds" is required but that the figure disclosed
as "amount financed" should include any itemized charges such as insur-
ance or recording fees.
IV. THE PUNCTILIO OF A TERMINOLOGY THE MOST SENSI-
TIVE
Disclosures "shall be made . . . in the terminology prescribed [by
Regulation Z].""' Creditors are held to this requirement with a rigor remi-
niscent of the standards Judge Cardozo prescribed for trustees." 2 The Act
expressly authorizes terminology "different from that employed in this
"07 Accord Liner v. Aetna Fin. Co., 555 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977); Chapman v. Public Fin.
Corp., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,126 (D.R.I. 1977); Budget Plan v. Williams, 5 CONS.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,162 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1977); Goodwin v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 338
So. 2d 1011 (Ala. 1976).
"1 442 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
1° Id. at 380.
"10 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,555.
"1 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1977).
112 Writing for the court in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928),
Judge (later Justice) Cardozo said:
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of equity when peti-




chapter. . . if it conveys substantially the same meaning,"'' 3 but this was
left up to the Board and the Board preferred to prescribe. Up to a point,
of course, the purpose of the Act necessitates uniform language so that
prospective debtors can shop around. Some cases may have passed that
point.
One of the most striking recent cases on the importance of literal com-
pliance, Desselles v. Mossy Motors, Inc.,'" reaches a result that is both
indefensible and clearly correct. The creditor obviously did not comply
strictly with the Regulation; but to penalize it was a mockery of any noble
goals Congress may have had in mind. A debtor bought a car and signed a
"sale and chattel mortgage" agreement, which was then assigned to a
finance company. The debtor knew-had been told-that the debt was
going to be assigned, but the disclosure statement did not identify the
finance company as a creditor. The court held this was a violation and
awarded the penalty."5 It is clear that the creditor did not comply with
section 226.6(d); yet it is also clear that in fact the information was given
to the debtor-he knew the information, and was not injured by its absence
from the disclosure form. The creditors sought relief because the debtor
already knew of the finance company, but this was dismissed as an argu-
ment "of equity which seemingly has no place in Truth-in-Lending,"" a
striking characterization of an act with such noble intentions. From this
and other cases on actual knowledge, it appears that truth-in-lending is
like the ancient English rules of pleading; substance counts for little, but
the forms must be followed.
Several other cases have similarly demanded rigid compliance, with
little attention to the value of the disclosures omitted or made incorrectly.
These results do not always even seem to be required by the Regulation."7
Arithmetic
A disclosure which does not tell the consumer the sum of 59 plus one is
in violation. The Regulation requires disclosure of the total number of
payments."8 One could argue that telling a debtor that his payments are
"equal monthly installments of $65.00 each for a period 59 months, and
the balance is due and payable five years after date" was a clearer method
of disclosure in this area. The federal district court in Powers v. Sims &
Levin Realtors"' thought otherwise, concluding that there was a violation
in not disclosing the "total" of 59 and one. Regrettably, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to comment on this
", Act § 112(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (1976).
' 442 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. La. 1978).
,,5 Id. at 903.
"' Id. at 902.
"' See text accompanying notes 118 to 143.
,, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(3) (1977).
' 396 F. Supp. 12, 20 (E.D. Va. 1975); accord, Lowery v. Finance American Corp., 32
N.C. App. 174, 231 S.E.2d 904, 911 (1977).
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and six other technical violations found by the lower court in Powers since
it affirmed on other grounds.' 0 This inability or unwillingness to comment
on the Act in detail speaks loudly as to the clarity and meaningfulness of
the Act's language. Perhaps the legislators should be subject to the same
penalty for failure to use clear and meaningful language as is the creditor
who so fails.
In passing, one cannot resist commenting that the unfortunate debtor
who hypothetically cannot add 59 and one will hardly be helped by the
more involved disclosures under Regulation Z.
The Scarlet Letter
Use of the plural form to describe a plural concept may be a violation.
The district court in Powers found a violation in the use of the phrase
"TOTAL FINANCE CHARGES" rather than "FINANCE CHARGE."'
2'
Again the Court of Appeals expressly declined to comment whether this
was right or wrong.12 2 One can characterize the use of the word "Total" and
the plural form as more descriptive and more accurate. Bussey v. Georgia
BankAmericard'2 3 and Mims v. Dixie Finance Corp.'4 found no violation
in the phrase "TOTAL FINANCE CHARGE," so perhaps the decisive
point was the letter "s," which the Regulation had not prescribed.
How Late Is Late?
In one case, a creditor disclosed that if payments were not paid when
due, a $4 late charge would be assessed. The debtor contended this was
misleading or confusing, because the note itself provided for a late charge
only when an installment was paid "more than 15 days after the due date
thereof." The judge agreed, and found a violation under section 226.6(c).'2
The court here apparently relied partly on the broad statements of pur-
poses in Section 102 of the Act. The probable result is that if a creditor
has to disclose the actual number of days before a late charge is imposed,
it will shorten the period. Too many consumers tend to take the full grace
period if it is forcefully called to their attention. A well-intentioned deci-
sion thus probably results in a shorter period for permissible late pay-
ments, to the prejudice of those consumers who may occasionally need that
grace period.
'- 542 F.2d 1216, 1219 (4th Cir. 1976). Similarly, see Carney v. Worthmore Furniture,
Inc., 561 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1977), where the trial court found inadequate a disclosure of "13
monthly installments of $36.00 (final payment to be $33.12)," since it was unclear whether
there were 13 or 14 total payments (the truth was 14). The court of appeals again refused to
decide if this was a violation, but the refusal is more understandable here since the issue was
merely one of ambiguity, not of the Act's requirements as in Powers.
1 396 F. Supp. at 20.
'2 542 F.2d at 1219.
' 516 F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1975).
121 426 F. Supp. 627, 628, 639 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
'2 Houston v. Atlanta Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 414 F. Supp. 851, 855 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
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Trade Name
One district judge has held that it is not enough to disclose a creditor's
trade name in a situation where the creditor is an individual person doing
business under a trade name.12 The regulation provides that a proper
disclosure statement is one "on which the creditor is identified."' 1 This
court thought this required the legal name of the creditor, reasoning that
the trade name would be of no use in taking legal action. Such reasoning
may be accurate in states where trade names need not be recorded with
any government agency,1  and yet it is hard to believe the debtor would
not have been able to sue knowing the trade name and-presumably-the
location.
As a related matter, it may be noted that a creditor is not necessarily
identified unless his street address is given. In Welmaker v. W. T. Grant
Co.,"' a case in which a creditor was part of a national chain and had
identified itself on the disclosure statement as "store #70," the court held
the street address should have been given, even though the Chicago ad-
dress of the home office appeared on the form. The court did not have
before it, of course, the issue of the sufficiency of some lesser address. A
later case, Houston v. Atlanta Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,130 did con-
clude that disclosure of just the name of the creditor was sufficient; the
case involved a savings and loan association that did business only in the
Atlanta metropolitan area, so the name alone may have been of more value
to the debtor than the name of W. T. Grant Co. in Welmaker. We submit,
however, that no one was misled or deprived of access to the creditor's
address in Welmaker. The decision would be easier to rationalize if it had
involved a lesser-known creditor.
V. THE LIFE OF THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN LOGIC
Occasional holdings under the Truth in Lending Act have been strik-
ingly detached from reason. Not only have they not lived on logic, but they
have defied experience as well."'1 The demands placed on creditors are
startling in these cases, especially in the "illegality" situation next dis-
cussed, where the creditor evidently did not know the fact it was penalized
for failing to disclose.
Illegality
In one fairly recent case, James v. American Finance System,"' the
I" Vines v. Hodges, 422 F. Supp. 1292, 1299 (D.D.C. 1976).
' 12 C.FR. § 226.8(a) (1977).
1 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-69 to 76 (1973 Repl. Volume).
I2 365 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
" 414 F. Supp. 851, 858-59 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
131 "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." 0. W. HoLMEs, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW (1881).
112 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,266 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
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creditor-apparently inadvertently-violated Georgia law in such a way
that the contract was null and void. The debtor had no enforceable obliga-
tion to make payments. The court quite seriously held that it was a viola-
tion of the Truth-in-Lending Act not to disclose to the consumer that he
had the privilege of not paying the loan at all. In one sense, of course, this
is irrefutable, because that may well be the single most material fact about
the transaction. It would certainly facilitate comparison shopping-the
best deal of all is not having to pay the loan back. On the other hand, it
seems unlikely that a creditor would knowingly get into that situation;
even the most wicked loan shark expects to get his money back. Ordinarily,
commercial institutions intend to do it legally, and design their forms to
this end. This strange holding is not mitigated by the fact that it appears
to have been reached by a special master, and merely confirmed by the
District Judge. Pinkett v. Credithrift of America, Inc., No. 2,133 a later case,
rejected the James result, noting that creditors normally attempt to pre-
pare enforceable notes. Pinkett requires that the disclosure statement
merely disclose what the note purports to require.' 34 The creditor-
defendant in Pinkett offered samples of the possible disclosure of voidness,
which demonstrate the absurdity of requiring such a disclosure.
In Pinkett, it was argued by the defendant that if the note was unen-
forceable, then there was no transaction subject to truth-in-lending. This
argument was, not unreasonably, rejected: "[I]t simply makes no sense
to exempt a creditor from liability for defects in his disclosure statement
merely because the loan agreement is later found to have been in violation
of state law . . "13
Property Insurance Proceeds
Are the rules regarding property insurance clear? One might have
thought so. Section 106(c) of the Act' 31 states that if liability or property
insurance is required, the charge or premium shall be included in the
finance charge unless there is a clear, specific statement in writing setting
forth the cost and stating that the debtor may choose the person through
which insurance is to be obtained. The word "person" is indefinite, so one
could argue that the language "through which the insurance is to be ob-
tained" refers only to the agent, not the insurer itself, because it does not
say "from which." Regulation Z is no more precise. Section 226.4(a)(6)
enunciates this anti-tie-in provision that found its way into a disclosure
law, stating that unless the debtor is told he has his choice of persons
through whom he may purchase, the property and liability insurance
premiums are included in the finance charge.'37 The Regulation also states,
'3 430 F. Supp. 113, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
'" But see the after-acquired property cases discussed above at text accompanying notes
103-04 supra, requiring disclosure of the limitations under U.C.C. § 9-204.
'1 430 F. Supp. at 115.
1' 15 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (1976).
137 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(6) (1977).
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by way of footnotes, that a policy owned by the customer and assigned or
otherwise made payable to a creditor is not insurance "written in connec-
tion with" a credit transaction, which would mean the premiums are not
part of the finance charge.'38
Section 129(a)(8) of the Act'39 specifies that in an extension of credit,
other than open end credit, a description of any security interest held or
to be retained or acquired by a creditor, and a clear identification of the
property to which it relates, must be disclosed. Section 226.8(b) (5) of Reg-
ulation Z similarly requires description or identification of any security
held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor. The "tan pamphlet"
contains six sample disclosure forms. Of these, Exhibits C and E refer to
insurance and to security interests, and disclose that insurance coverage
is voluntary. Exhibit E conveys a security interest in chattels, i.e., motor
vehicles, household goods and appliances, and "other." It discloses insur-
ance if purchased through the creditor, but apparently insurance is not
required, or if it is required acquisition through the creditor is not. The
authors estimate that property insurance is required in almost all secured
financing where real estate with significant improvements is involved; in
transactions involving motor vehicles, it is generally required if the creditor
takes a security interest in a motor vehicle. We thought it fair to assume
that the Federal Reserve Board was aware of this, especially since the
Board's bank examination forms facilitate criticism-even invite criti-
cism-of lenders if insurance policies do not reside in the bank files when
a security agreement or real estate deed of trust is involved.
In 1977, however, the Third Circuit decided Gennuso v. Commercial
Bank & Trust Co. "I The court held that disclosure was required of a secu-
rity interest in the property insurance where the debtor granted a security
interest in a car and agreed to insure it with a loss-payable clause to the
creditor. So far as truth in lending goes, the creditor may require insur-
ance, and in secured financing he ordinarily does. In fact, insurance is now
recognized under section 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1972
revision, as "proceeds" of the collateral. Are we to suppose that creditors
all along had been disclosing that, if there was a security interest in the
collateral, then there was a like security interest in any required insurance
if there was a loss-payable clause?"' Or did the plaintiff in the Gennuso
case find a technical requirement that had previously escaped the sharp
eyes of the promulgator of Regulation Z and of the multitudes of credi-
tors who have been trying to comply with the law, and the lesser multi-
tudes of plaintiffs who are trying to find errors in the disclosure forms? We
suspect the latter.
12 C.F.R. §§ 226.4(a)(5) n.3, 226.4(a)(6) n.4 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(8) (1976).
"' 566 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
,4, Indeed, there may be a security interest in the proceeds of even non-required insur-
ance regardless of the loss payee. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
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Moreover, we note that the insurance proceeds (and refund of unearned
premium) did not exist at the time of disclosures. The Gennuso court did
not consider the applicability of section 226.6(g),112 even though the crea-
tion of insurance proceeds would seem to be an unanticipated subsequent
occurrence just as much as is a default-unless, of course, the creditor
knows in advance that the debtor is going to wreck the collateral."'
CONCLUSION
We would hope the mishmash of cases presented here would demon-
strate that the statute and regulation have not themselves been clear and
meaningful. If we might paraphrase one creditor in the earlier days of
Truth-in-Lending, it might illustrate the point. He commented that if he
were going to bilk the poor and uneducated of the ghetto, he would proceed
in the same manner as Truth-in-Lending and give the consumer more
information than he can possibly comprehend.
The benefit of Truth-in-Lending is hard to discern. The annual reports
of the Federal Reserve Board to Congress comment that the Board believes
there is a more informed consumer and a more informed use of credit.
Interest rates on consumer loans have risen since 1969, however, and in the
early 1970's economic conditions forced consumer interest rates and other
interest rates even higher, to levels that Truth-in-Lending could not stem.
Perhaps consumer interest rates would have been higher still without the
advent of Truth-in-Lending but one wonders. One lawyer mentions with
amusement a client who came to him about 1969 or 1970, commenting that
he had gotten a real good deal on a first mortgage, about 11%, because with
the advent of Truth-in-Lending he knew that oil companies and credit card
companies charged 18%. Truth-in-Lending had not taught him the differ-
ence between mortgage credit and convenience credit, and might be char-
acterized as having misled him.144 Most of the disclosures seem too esoteric
or too obvious for an Act of Congress.
A side effect of Truth-in-Lending has been to benefit the credit card
industry, by effectively putting small creditors out of the business of ex-
tending credit because they could not afford the legal talent necessary to
1 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(g) (1977) provides that the Act is not violated where subsequent
events cause the information originally disclosed to become inaccurate.
113 The Gennuso court also found a violation in that the "Note and Security Agreement"
included a reference, in boldface type, to a "foregoing warrant of attorney to confess judg-
ment," while there was no such warrant. The disclosure statement did not mention such a
warrant, perhaps because there was none, but the court said it was confusing to have the
reference in the Note and Security Agreement. 566 F.2d at 443. That is, there was no warrant,
and no warrant was disclosed, but it was held illegal to have a reference to it on the Note
and Security Agreement even though neither the Act nor the Regulation purports to control
the contents of anything except the disclosure statement. Indeed the whole purpose the
disclosure statement is supposedly to clear up confusion resulting from Notes and Security
Agreements.
" Perhaps we will eventually have a law merely requiring debtors to read contracts
before they sign, and forbidding them to sign if they do not understand.
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comply with the complex subtleties of Truth-in-Lending and other con-
sumer legislation. The bank credit card offers other benefits to the small
merchant as well, of course, and we may be amiss in pointing the finger
at Truth-in-Lending as forcing the small merchant out of the credit busi-
ness; however, it was a factor.
Truth-in-Lending was a well-intended statute. Unfortunately, it seems
to serve mostly as a trap for the unwary creditor, increasing the cost of
credit extensions and eliminating the small credit extender from the mar-
ket as opposed to achieving benefits for the consumers on whose behalf it
was enacted. Consumers have gotten windfalls because of creditors' errors,
some of which were unintentional and meaningless. This is not exactly the
policy of benefiting consumers attributed to Congress when it enacted this
legislation.
It would be much better for debtors as well as creditors if Congress
would limit Truth-in-Lending disclosures to the Annual Percentage Rate
(to permit rate comparison and shopping), the Total Finance Charge (the
cost of credit), and the Total of Payments (or the total burden on the
consumer). This might be more meaningful, and certainly would be sim-
pler and less of a trap.
Writing this article, the authors were apprehensive that they were being
unduly critical of Truth in Lending. This concern was relieved by a federal
judge when the article was nearly finished. Holding against a creditor,
Judge Charles Clark wrote for the Fifth Circuit that "[o]nce again, de-
spite proper and reasonable efforts to comply, an installment sales creditor
falls victim to the complex disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending
Act."'' No national policy or public intrest requires such a result, and no
law should.
"I A reasonable case could also be made for requiring disclosure of prepayment provi-
sions, which may vary between creditors and which debtors may not otherwise understand.
"I McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1978), discussed at n.30 supra.
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